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Appellant submits the following Reply Brief in response
to Respondents Brief in response to Respondent's Brief.
2QIB2-J
VESTED PROPERTY INTEREST CANNOT BE CREATED
BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHEN IT UNDERMINES
AND DESTROYS PUBLIC POLICY ON UNCLAIMED
PROPERTY AS ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURE
THROUGH A LAW PASSED SUBSEQUENT TO PASSAGE
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
In 1957 the Utah Legislature in effect repudiated the
doctrine of escheat by establishing and endorsing a new concept
known as the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property law.
This, in effect, requires all corporations or business holding
funds or property belonging to an owner they cannot locate, to
turn it over to the Utah State Treasurer.

He, basically, "stands

in the shoes of the owner" and holds for him.
Owners or their heirs wno file claims are paid and the
unclaimed balance is used for public purposes by being deposited
in the Uniform School Fund.

Owners or heirs, without any

limitation of time, may come forward and claim a refund of all
that is being held.

A trust fund has been established

sufficiently large to enable all claims to be paid.

In the case

of money orders cashed by Travelers Express after having been
reported as unclaimed property and the funds paid in, repayment
will be made by the Treasurer's Office upon submission of the
cashed money order.
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While the basic question to be decided in this case is
whether the six-year Statute of Limitations applies, or whether
the later passed law setting a seven-year presumption of
abandonment statutory period overrules the six-year period.
However, a deeper underlying question is really whether the
Uniform Unclaimed Property Law can be circumvented and public
policy be thwarted by the use of the Statute of Limitations to
permit corporate escheat.
A basic concept is that escheat is not favored in the
law.

Recently Jix.iJa£-J&a±J^

3XULlteXS>lA-2*~Xa£ZjL-AS£&aB£Ai 659 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1983) this
court overruled a past precedent to give an estate to heirs who
showed up many years after escheat ordinarily occurred.

If the

court upholds the respondent in this case, it will be permitting/
even affirming, the doctrine of escheat in a different form,
namely corporate escheat.
Corporate escheat, if permitted, will divert funds from
public purposes, and ultimately from owners or heirs just as
effectively as public escheat will divert funds from owners and
their heirs.
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TRAVELERS EXPRESS COMPANY, INC. MAY NOT
BE SELECTIVE IN APPLYING STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS ONLY TO STATE AND NOT TO OTHER _
OWNERS SUBJECT TO UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT,
AND NOT APPLYING TO OWNERS WHO CASH MONEY
ORDERS AFTER SIX YEARS.

. .

The appellants contend that when money orders are
purchased and issued that they are subject to the six-year
Statute of Limitations, and that at the end of six years, the
holder has a vested right in the funds.
Two questions immediately come to mind.

(1) Is

Travelers Express Company taking the position that all of its
money orders sold within the State of Utah are good for only six
years?

(2) Will Travelers Express Company refuse to cash any

money order older than six years for any customer?
A resounding n no n answer is so obvious that it hardly
needs to be mentioned.

Nowhere in the record is there any

evidence that money orders are not honored by Travelers Express
after six years, except those claimed by the State Treasurer
under the Unclaimed Property Law.

No time limits are ever

brought to the buyer's attention.
After asserting the statute,

±Jc&X£^htt^b££ix~3~y3lX££-££

JLi when any time barred money orders have been cashed older than
six years.

The defense of the Statute of Limitations may not be

asserted against the State of Utah, and then waived against
owners of money orders who present them for payment after six
years.

The issuing company cannot observe a double standard.
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This principle was the central point in the
c a s e of £ £ u i J i - £ 3 X £ l i i ^
LAfJLIllSUX3J}££~£Qm£anx,

221 S.E.2d 522 (1975).

It is clear from the records that the
respondent would never attempt a forfeiture
against a policy holder, and that the point
is now raised only as against the Tax
Commission. The derivative nature of the
Commission's rights under the act must be
considered. If the owner of presumed
abandoned property has any rights, which are
conceded by Metropolitan these rights accrue
in their entirety to the commission.
M^LQ^Qllt&XL.m^^IXQir^MSd^&^itS^SQI^I^^Xr^^l
Xi&££~&£~£Q~£h£££^2Qli£i££~&$^ns£^£h£
pjDlJ^XJtelite^
Il$)&S~^^n££~£b£~Tax~£QimiSSiQ&.
(Emphasis
added.)

The case further stated . . . "Both in law and equity
forfeitures are abhorredf but by the same token waivers are
favored."
The same would be true of forfeited money orders to
Travelers Express.

It would bring about corporate escheat.

On

the other hand, the waiver doctrine would protect the funds for
the true owners, and would be returned to the owner by the State
Treasurer when claimed.
Also, another case applying the waiver doctrine stated:
It is probable that the bank would never
attempt such a forfeiture against a
traveler's check purchaser, and that the
point is now raised only as against the
controller. If this is so, the derivative
nature of the controller's rights under the
act must be born in mind. If the owner of
presumed abandoned property has any rights,
those rights accrue in their entirety to the
controller.
!&x£^bank„m3x~L&£~X3lX£~lic£
£QI&ia££UI^li2h££~££~±£~£~S£££ti&S££-££
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£Ql&££ll££*

(Emphasis added.)

Bank~Q£~M£Ji£3^X±~£xan£ten,

252 Cal.App.2d 208 (1967K_

The same conclusion was reached in a "money order"
case.

See £s>£XSjL~G£ld£n~S±a±£~Bank,

Cal.App., 157 Cal.Rptr.

538f 95 CA.3rd 360.
In the recent case of

Dsnnl£~Jji~B&b££££j.~IIj.~££sl±~XjL

T££XSl£££~EX2£SJS£-.£Q]&&aJKi-t.-.In£' No. C.A. 80-4443 in the Superior
Court of Rhode Island, June 17, 1982.

Mr. Justice Albert E.

DeRobbio after reviewing the evidence and nearing arguments in a
summary judgment hearing stated the following in a transcript of
his reasons for ftis decision as follows:
A waiver is a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right, claim or
privilege. . . . This court concurs with the
findings of the California court in the case
of 2£3X£l£££^Ex&££££
against £££%, number
77-1086R, decided January 8, 1980, that
Travelers has waived such a service charge.
And I quote the language from that case,
"Since the controller's rights under
California's Unclaimed Property Law are
derivative and he succeeds to whatever rights
the owners of abandoned property have, the
waiver of service charges by plaintiff as to
the owners in any event defeats any rignt
Travelers might seek to assert against the
controller."
The court's order signed by Justice DeRobbio on July
9, 1982 stated:
#4. Travelers Express has never attempted to
collect these service charges from owners or
payees of the money orders regardless of when
presented for payment, but has instead
followed a practice of waiving such charges
to all except the state.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 5 -

In the present case on appeal, Travelers Express may
not waive its assertion of the Statute of Limitation against
individual money order owners and not waive this right against
the State Treasurer*

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE
UTAH UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT SUPERSEDES THE
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The original unclaimed property law passed in 1957 did
not specifically, mention money orders, although we maintain tnat
they were covered by Section 78-44-8, U.C.A. (1953) which covered
"all intangible personal property not otherwise covered by this
act. "
A.Jgp££ifi£^sm£J3dmeJDi-.iil-.1555 clearly showed the
legislative intent of covering money orders when the specific
words "money orders" were included.

This was two years after

Section 16 of the Uniform Act dealing with the Statute of
Limitations was omitted at the passage of the Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act in 1957.
The Legislature certainly would not have amended in
these words through passage of a specific bill if it would have
been a useless and meaningless gesture.

It would have been

totally without purpose if the Legislature had intended to
continue to recognize the six-year Statute of Limitations.
This 1959 amendment shows the clear intent of the
Legislature that money orders were to be covered by the unclaimed
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property law, and that companies issuing money orders must report
those that were uncashed for seven years.
Thus, the principle of legislative intent argued
extensively by respondents in their brief that the Statute of
Limitations was intended to supersede the effect of the Unclaimed
Property Act has been totally demolished by the 1959 amendment,
particularly in reference to money orders.

Therefore, the

extensive quote from the case of

S£a££^Q£^I]£ah^£x^£3ljL^Bak3X~XjL

Jni££m£im£ailk~Faimg££~&£SQ£i££lQnt

668 P.2d 503 (1983) is not in

point nor applicable.

The public policy to be concerned about is

the unclaimed property disposition policy which is a successor to
the old escheat policy, and it has a far higher priority than
whether the Statute of Limitations should continue.
A brief explanation of tne reference to a Bar by the
Statute of Limitations in Section 78-44-11(5). U.C.A. (1953) and
in Regulation #10 issued by the State Treasurer shortly after the
1957 act was adopted needs to be explained.
The State Treasurer has always upheld the principle of
Jx.Sl.aBlLXjL~M££ll&££b, 61 Pac. 901 (Utah) that once the Statute of
Limitations has fully run, and it has not been waived, it becomes
a vested right.

Therefore, in recognizing that the statute nad

fully run on any property held by a nolder at least six years
prior to the 1957 passage of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.,
In other words before 1951, there should have been placed in the
law a passage which recognized this right, and stating that such
was not reportable.

That was the reason for Section 78-44-11(5),
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and that was the reason for Regulation #10 so that these prior
rights would be recognized and not excluded*

However once the

law had recognized these exceptions, the future reporting was
done, the public policy of unclaimed property would have priority
over the Statute of Limitations/ and no later vested rights
tnrough that statute would accrue.

Regulation #10 and subsection

11(5) would no longer be relevant, and would become nullities.
In summary, t h e case of ]]£a]o^e]L*X£l±-*3ak&X-2±
In£££BD]}n£ailL.F&xm£X£~&J5SQ£i£iriQIl, £]1£X3, has been quoted
extensively and heavily relied upon by respondents.

However,

such reliance is improper and faulty since such case was given
tne following very narrow interpretation by this court.
Since our conclusion t h a t the s t a t e has
no r i g h t to the custody of these patronage
c r e d i t s i s based on t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s to a p a r t i c u l a r type
of property covered by a p a r t i c u l a r oylaw
provision of the holder, we have no occasion
t o r u l e on other q u e s t i o n s argued by the
parties. . . .
W£^£l£Q^£X$xess~nQ~Q£ini£iL*.£&

£h^avBli£&illte-s>£~Jkh^££aJui££-Q£

liirui^isjis^is-

£&hSX~±h£^£a£X£I&S£~.£X£&i£JS.
added).

(Emphasis

£QB£LU£IQ]$

Defendants-Appellants respectfully request the Court to
reverse the decision of the District Court.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 16th day of November, 1984.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
f

JOSEPH p. M C C A R T H Y

Assistant Attorney General
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This is to certify that I mailed two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants,
postage prepaid, to L. Ridd Larson and Douglas Matsumori of Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker, 400 Desert Building, Salt Lake City, OT 841111996 this 16th day of November, 1984.
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